Page:Seventh Report - Guns for gold- the Wagner Network exposed.pdf/16

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Guns for gold:the Wagner Network exposed
Years of first Involvment Country Nature of Involvment Further information
2021 Mali Sustained involvment 2021 -Mali -Sustained - involvement - Wagner was invited by Mali’s military junta to provide security services against Islamist militant groups, following a coup by Colonel Assimi Goita in May 2021. Wagner operatives reportedly arrived in late 2021.[1] In December 2021, the UK and its international partners strongly condemned the deployment of Wagner fighters to Mali.[2] Before Wagner mercenaries were visible in Mali, Russian soft power had already played an important role in influencing public opinion on its involvement in Mali.[3] A Wagner/Prigozhin-affiliated entity, the Foundation for the Protection of National Values (FZNC), published surveys after the military coup in 2021, showcasing opinions in favour of Russian intervention and negative perceptions of the French military’s Operation Barkhane.[4] Following Colonel Assimi Goita’s accession to power, efforts continued to influence the perception of local populations in favour of an alliance with Russia and, in turn, to support the arrival of Wagner mercenaries.70[5]

11. In addition to these seven countries, there are a further four where we have high confidence of the Wagner Network’s non-military involvement since 2014: Zimbabwe, the DRC, Madagascar, and South Africa. These countries are presented in Table 3.


  1. CSIS, ‘Tracking the Arrival of Russia’s Wagner Group in Mali’, 2 February 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
  2. UK Government, UK and international partners condemn Wagner Group’s plan to deploy mercenaries in Mali, 23 December 2021 (accessed 16 July 2023)
  3. CIR open-source research
  4. CIR open-source research. Note FZNC has been sanctioned by the US Government. See Appendix 1.
  5. CIR open-source research