Page:Seventh Report - Guns for gold- the Wagner Network exposed.pdf/18

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Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed

12. In addition to these 11 countries (paras 9–10), there are six countries where we have medium confidence that entities within the Wagner Network have operated since 2014, but not as a fighting force. These countries are presented in Table 4. Companies registered in other countries have also facilitated the Wagner Network’s payments and operations.[1]

Table 4: Medium-confidence countries where the Wagner Network has carried out non-military activities (between 2014 and June 2023)

Caption text
Years of first Involvment Country Nature of involvment Further involvment
2021 Afghanistan Unknown Afghanistan - Unknown - We have medium confidence

that Wagner has been recruiting former members of the Afghan army and that key figures linked to the Wagner Network have met with representatives of the Taliban since August 2021 to offer strategic communication services.[2]

2022 Burkina Faso Durable Durable -We have medium confidence that,

since 2022, Prigozhin-affiliated media (RiaFan) organised pro-Russian campaigns on social media since mid-2022, in the build-up to a second coup.[3] unconfirmed reports of a deal between the national government and the Wagner Network.[4]

Allegedly 2017/2018 Cameroon Durable We have medium confidence that

Wagner operatives have used Cameroon as a logistics corridor[5] and where we have medium confidence that the network uses the port at Douala to ship ‘blood diamonds’ and other mineral extracted products, constituting a durable presence in-country.[6]


  1. Assessing US sanctions notices, Professor Jason Blazakis judged it “highly likely” that Asia-based companies in Thailand and Hong Kong (Shine Drago Group Limited, Shen Yang Jing Cheng Machinery Imp&Exp. Company, and Zhe Jiang Jiayi Small Commodities Trade Company Limited) “facilitated transactions on behalf of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group.” See Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023)
  2. CIR provided this assessment, noting, “Complaints by Afghan forces that Wagner have been recruiting ex-soldiers exiled in Iran to fight in Ukraine are unconfirmed. HUMINT sources with networks in Afghanistan have reported the same, but cannot be verified. Supposedly, these are being recruited from the former elite National Army Commando Corps, and represent some of the best US-trained forces in the former Afghan army.” See also Foreign Policy, ‘Russia Is Recruiting Afghan Soldiers for the War in Ukraine’, 25 October 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
  3. CIR open-source research
  4. PQ UIN 108126 [on Burkina Faso], Answered on 20 December 2022
  5. Jeune Afrique, ‘Comment Wagner se finance: enquête sur l’eldorado d’Evgueni Prigojine en Centrafrique et au Cameroun’ (French), 12 January 2023 (accessed 16 July 2023)
  6. CIR open-source research