Despite this symbiotic relationship, evidence from a former Wagner fighter indicates that operational tensions between the network and the Russian Ministry of Defence are long-standing.[1]
15. The Wagner Network is highly opportunistic and not a straightforward proxy for Russia, even though the Russian state has sometimes directed, facilitated, and supported its military operations, notably in Libya and Ukraine. Even when the network has acted purely in its own economic interests, Russia is likely to have benefited financially or in geopolitical influence from its presence. Its guiding hand has been the Russian state.
Incentives for buyers
16. A former Wagner fighter was positive about the role of the Wagner Network, saying, “the Wagner Group has real autonomy and, in my view, has earnt its well-developed brand.”[2]This individual provided detailed examples from CAR to demonstrate the point.[3] We received little other evidence that defended the record of Wagner fighters. However, it is logical to assume that the host governments perceived benefits from engaging with the Wagner Network. Many governments sought military protection against security threats, sometimes disillusioned with the international community’s efforts.[4]Accordingly, the network has offered counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency operations, provided training unrestrained by human rights obligations, and supplied weapons and military equipment.
- ↑ “In 2017, before the start of the operation to seize oil fields in Syria, Prigozhin tried to organise the deployment of combat units of the PMC Wagner to Syria and the supply of weapons and ammunition, bypassing the Ministry of Defence. On account of this, Prigozhin’s relations with Shoigu deteriorated […] the Russian Minister of Defence sabotaged implementation of the agreed plan of co-operation […] The military refused to transport PMC Wagner units on board their aircraft or by the navy’s ships. In addition, the military, under various pretexts, did not supply weapons and ammunition […] Prigozhin could not buy enough weapons, then he was not given the power to acquire weapons and ammunition abroad in the amounts needed for large-scale military operations. After Putin intervened in this conflict between Shoigu and Prigozhin, the previous scheme of liaison between PMCs and military departments was restored. The mercenaries were delivered on military transport aircraft, and the PMC was again integrated with the Ministry of Defence, and received weapons and ammunition in the required quantities, although not of the latest designs.” Anonymous (WGN0026)
- ↑ Anonymous (WGN0026)
- ↑ “Since the suppression of rebel activity in the Central African Republic by the PMC Wagner detachments, the level of violence in this country has significantly decreased and the situation has stabilised. At the moment, there is no movement back to escalating tension or exacerbated civil conflict. The civil war subsided. This is a fact. PMC Wagner, as a result of assisting expansion of the zone of control of the central government in parallel with the displacement of rebel (in other words, criminal) formations in the interior, has contributed to stabilisation of this country. In Mali, Russian mercenaries are fighting against al-Qaeda and anti-government groups, erroneously implementing the same gameplan, but nevertheless without negative consequences for the civilian population.” Anonymous (WGN0026)
- ↑ For example “Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop said that interventions by the international community had not worked and the country had to consider new options.” Wagner Group: Why the EU is alarmed by Russian mercenaries in Central Africa, BBC News, 19 December 2021
