2 Responses to the Wagner Network
The UK’s general response
33. In February, the Minister told us that “we must treat [the Wagner Network] very seriously as a destabilising threat”.[1] The UK Government’s response focuses on Ukraine, which is the Wagner Network’s “main theatre of operations”.[2] The Minister called the UK’s lethal aid and support to the Ukrainian military “front and centre of our effort”.189[3]As of 23 May 2023, the UK was the second largest donor of military assistance to Ukraine and had committed £4.6 billion so far.[4] Calling it “gruesome”, Christo Grozev of Bellingcat told us that “Ukraine is doing part of the job for all of us now” by killing so many Wagner fighters on the battlefield.[5]
34. In addition to defence support to Ukraine, the UK is responding to the Wagner Network via:
- •sanctions (see paragraphs 43–61),
- •bilateral and multilateral diplomacy,[6] including work with partner states on “nation building and investing in institutions”;[7]
- •tracking activity by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office.[10]
The UK has also committed to [emphasis added]:
a new approach to countering state threats below the threshold of armed conflict, organising cross-government activity into four lines of effort: protecting ourselves, our allies and partners from the impact of this activity; engaging domestically and internationally to raise awareness of it and to deepen cooperation on countering it; building a deeper understanding of states’ activity and how to respond effectively; and competing directly with these states in creative and assertive ways, when appropriate.[11]
- ↑ Q223
- ↑ Q108
- ↑ Q108
- ↑ Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion, Research Briefing 9477, House of Commons Library, 23 May 2023, p 4
- ↑ Q59
- ↑ The UK raised concerns directly with the Russian, Libyan and Sudanese authorities. The Government has also said it is working closely with international partners to counter the malign use of such proxies by Russia and it aims to “build consensus around responsible state behaviour and competition and promote understanding globally about the risks that PMCs acting as state proxies pose to international security and stability.” Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 4; PQ UIN 59567 [on Sudan: Gold], Answered on 18 October 2022
- ↑ Q108 [Leo Docherty]
- ↑ For instance, the FCDO’s written evidence notes that the Secretary of State for Defence has spoken out about Wagner activities in Africa, the Middle East and Ukraine; FCDO Minister Ford expressed concern over Wagner presence in Mali.
- ↑ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 4
- ↑ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 5
- ↑ HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world, CP 811, March 2023, para 16
