Page:Seventh Report - Guns for gold- the Wagner Network exposed.pdf/45

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Guns for gold:the Wagner Network exposed
43

—to tackle the threats we face from organisations such as the Wagner Group”.[1]Despite these signs, the UK Government’s official policy remains not to comment on the possible proscription of the Wagner Network as a terrorist organisation,[2] and UK allies such as the EU and US have also held back from proscription.[3] Professor Blazakis suggested that the UK and Five Eyes countries have been “reticent” to use terrorist proscriptions against groups that are linked to a nation state, and that “precedent is a very difficult line for bureaucrats to cross”, due to its wider implications.[4] It is worth noting that the UK lacks a system for proscribing a country as a ‘State Sponsor’ of Terrorism,[5]as some have advocated for Russia, but the decision not to designate a state actor through terrorism legislation is nevertheless a policy decision, rather than a legal one.[6]

67. Summing up options, Professor Blazakis recommended that the Government: [emphasis added]

consider deploying terrorism proscriptions, expand law enforcement investigations against individuals that facilitate activities on behalf of the Wagner Group, and ratchet up diplomatic efforts to tarnish Wagner’s reputation overseas. Of course, civil society should pursue legal action against known Wagner Group members […]. A combination of those activities could still erode Wagner’s effectiveness, but time is becoming short[7]

68. There is an opportunity to disrupt the Wagner Network at a time when its future is uncertain. We recommend that the Government seizes this opportunity and works with international partners to deter countries from engaging with the Wagner Network, using a carrot and stick approach.

69. As the Government improves its intelligence on the network, it should declassify it strategically and share it with countries that are considering engaging with the Wagner Network, to demonstrate the organisation’s destabilising effects, following the lead of the United States administration.

70. The Government should offer a genuinely compelling alternative to priority countries in need of investment and security partnership, in collaboration with partners. Priority countries are especially likely to be neighbouring countries to those where the Wagner Network is engaged. A compelling alternative may involve customising packages of military, aid and trade support to specific countries, particularly in the Sahel region.

71. In its response to this report, the Government should set out the factors it will assess in determining whether countries are priorities for UK security partnerships. These factors should include (but not be limited to):


  1. Oral evidence taken on 12 June 2023, HC (2022–23) 171, Q508 [James Cleverly]
  2. UK poised to label Wagner group terrorists as France urges EU to act, The Guardian, 10 May 2023. However, the US has labelled the Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organisation. US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization’, 26 January 2023 (accessed 16 July 2023)
  3. UK poised to label Wagner group terrorists as France urges EU to act, The Guardian, 10 May 2023. However, the US has labelled the Wagner Group as a transnational criminal organisation. US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization’, 26 January 2023 (accessed 16 July 2023)
  4. Q78
  5. PQ UIN88866 [on Russia: Terrorism], Answered on 23 November 2022
  6. Given the Government’s power to change law.
  7. Q67