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Guns for gold:the Wagner Network exposed
45

3 What next?


What next for Wagner?

74. At the time of writing, the situation is fluid. Recent events in Russia fundamentally altered the relationship between Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian Government. The network may be consolidating its operations abroad or it may be fighting for its life. Russian media have shown Wagner flags being lowered, suggesting its operations in Russia are winding down. Although the last month has seen significant debate on the future of the Wagner Network,[1]no early signs have yet emerged on its future. The network’s heavy reliance on the Russian state for military equipment and logistical support may challenge its combat operations, unless the network can find alternative suppliers of weapons and ammunition.[2] The Russian government may seek to ‘nationalise’ the network—as we have seen with demands that all fighters sign paperwork to join Russia’s standing forces—but whether it can is another question.[3] There is reason to believe that the network will evolve rather than cease its operations altogether, as the Russian state has a vested interest in maintaining it for foreign policy and wealth acquisition purposes. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has already stated Wagner’s operations in Mali and the Central African Republic “will continue”.[4] Likewise, a Russian envoy recently reassured General Haftar of Wagner operatives’ continued presence in Libya,297[5] and Russia remains a committed regional actor in Africa.[6] The network’s ties to the GRU may also support its survival.[7] The last decade has shown that the Wagner Network is highly effective at reconfiguring itself. We expect its activities to continue in some form, as they are too valuable, especially financially, to the Russian state to be lost. The question is not just what happens to the Wagner Network but what happens to a wider set of PMCs in


  1. Some aspects of Prigozhin’s media operations have already closed; some Wagner personnel left CAR; there has been a pause in recruitment. See Prigozhin media group closes following leader’s exile from Russia, JURIST, 4 July 2023; Wagner troops leave Central African Republic after ‘refusing contracts with Russia’, Sky News, 7 July 2023; Russia’s Wagner Group Suspends Recruitment In Wake Of Mutiny, Radio Free Europe, 3 July 2023.
  2. According to a former fighter, “For PMC Wagner the Russian MOD remains its main supply hub for weapons and ammunition. If this artery is blocked, then PMC Wagner, having used up the available ammunition, will simply lose its ability to conduct combat operations. The base camp of PMC Wagner is located on a Russian military training ground i.e. land belonging to the Ministry of Defence.” Anonymous (WGN0026). See also Wagner’s future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny, Financial Times, 28 June 2023.
  3. Whether the Russian state could match the salaries of Wagner fighters is a question. Many operatives also feel loyal to Prigozhin personally. ‘It is like a virus that spreads’: business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network, The Guardian, 6 July 2023; Wagner still recruiting despite mutiny, BBC finds, BBC News, 29 June 2023
  4. Wagner and Russia are here to stay in Africa, says Kremlin’s top diplomat, POLITICO, 26 June 2023
  5. It is like a virus that spreads’: business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network, The Guardian, 6 July 2023
  6. It is hosting its Russia-Africa summit in late July 2023. Wagner Will Keep Part of Its African Business After Russian Mutiny, Yahoo, 10 July 2023; Wagner mercenaries will not be withdrawn from Africa, says Russia, The Guardian, 26 June 2023
  7. Wagner’s future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny, Financial Times, 28 June 2023