the six cumulative conditions that must be satisfied.[1] Proelium Law called for a workable international definition that “adequately differentiates PMSCs used to build capability for corrupt governments and those which are legitimate businesses”.316[2]
78. Perhaps implicitly recognising these ambiguities, the UK Government expressed a desire to “build consensus around responsible state behaviour and competition” when it comes to states’ use of PMCs.[3] It promotes international voluntary initiatives to encourage responsible practices among PMSCs themselves.[4] There is also domestic regulation of companies.[5] The Government has limited interest in changing the existing national regulation or non-voluntary initiatives, believing that its current approach “provide[s] the necessary safeguards” for PMSC activities. The fact that the Government has no plans to ratify the UN Mercenaries Convention (an international treaty designed to ban the recruitment, use or financing of mercenaries) due to disagreements with its definitions, would suggest that this is not as clear as the Government asserts.[6]
79. Transparency International called international voluntary initiatives a “step in the right direction”, but warned of their limited support among states.[7] KCL academic Christopher Kinsey and Col. Christopher Mayer (US Army Retd) have warned that recent changes to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services may inadvertently provide greater legitimacy to organisations like the Wagner Network, because they appear to have made it more acceptable for PMSCs to carry out offensive activities.[8]
80. Our predecessor committee carried out a detailed report in 2002 into PMCs, responding to the Government’s Green Paper (June 2002) outlining different legislative
- ↑ Proelium Law (WGN0016) para 5.2. See also Q7 [Sorcha MacLeod]. These six conditions are as follows. According to Article 47 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, a mercenary is any person who:
- (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
- (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
- (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
- (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
- (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
- (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces
- ↑ Proelium Law (WGN0016)
- ↑ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 4
- ↑ For example, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services and the ISO management system. The Government has also worked with the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG), a “UK-based Special Interests Group for the Private Security Sector, on the transparent regulation of Private Security and Maritime companies”. Among other things, SCEG members are expected to comply with national legislation and documents such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Services, and the Montreux Document. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 6
- ↑ Domestically, the UK Security Industry Authority (set up in 2001 by Private Security Industry Act) regulates the private security industry “by operating a licensing regime for individual security operatives and a voluntary approvals scheme for security businesses”. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 6
- ↑ Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023
- ↑ Transparency International Defence & Security, Transparency International UK (WGN0021) para 3.4
- ↑ Defence-in-Depth, ‘A step too far: how the ICoCA actions could unintentionally help to privatise war (Part One)’ (accessed 16 July 2023); Defence-in-Depth, ‘A step too far: how the ICoCA actions could unintentionally help to privatise war (Part Two)’ (accessed 16 July 2023)
