18. We recommend that the Government establishes a specific and regular mechanism for coordinating with the United States and the European Union over Wagner- linked sanctions; it should report back to us on what these mechanisms are, and how frequently and effectively they are being used. (Paragraph 59)
19. We further recommend that the Government prioritises introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals as a likely deterrent to involvement in the network, in particular working with Turkey, a popular holiday destination for Russians. (Paragraph 60)
20. In the public interest, we have compiled Wagner-linked names that are already a matter of public record, as identified via our commissioned open-source research (see Appendix 2). In doing so, we hope to challenge the mystique that the Wagner Network cultivated in many countries, make it as difficult as possible for it to operate, create a deterrent effect, and enable the Government to improve its apparently limited understanding of the network. (Paragraph 61)
21. We implore the Government to urgently assess these names and impose sanctions on these individuals and entities if the necessary threshold is met. (Paragraph 61)
22. There is an opportunity to disrupt the Wagner Network at a time when its future is uncertain. (Paragraph 68)
23. We recommend that the Government seizes this opportunity and works with international partners to deter countries from engaging with the Wagner Network, using a carrot and stick approach. (Paragraph 68)
24. As the Government improves its intelligence on the network, it should declassify it strategically and share it with countries that are considering engaging with the Wagner Network, to demonstrate the organisation’s destabilising effects, following the lead of the United States administration. (Paragraph 69)
25. The Government should offer a genuinely compelling alternative to priority countries in need of investment and security partnership, in collaboration with partners. Priority countries are especially likely to be neighbouring countries to those where the Wagner Network is engaged. A compelling alternative may involve customising packages of military, aid and trade support to specific countries, particularly in the Sahel region. (Paragraph 70)
26. In its response to this report, the Government should set out the factors it will assess in determining whether countries are priorities for UK security partnerships. These factors should include (but not be limited to): (Paragraph 71)
- (a) the UK’s capacity for influence in a specific country;
- (b) the level of security challenge faced by a country (in the short, medium and long term);
- (c) the level of demand for a bilateral/multilateral security partnership within a country;
