has often served and furthered Russian foreign policy goals,[1] as shown by the significant funding,[2] support[3] and (in some cases) direction[4] it received from the Russian state. Although complex to determine which individuals and entities sit within the ‘Wagner Network’, we consider that they all share an ultimate connection to Prigozhin’s financial interests and normally benefit the Russian state indirectly or directly.
4. Our inquiry also examined the Wagner Network through a wider lens, considering the legal and policy challenge of ‘Private Military Companies’ (PMCs) that states use as malign proxies (paragraphs 75–91). PMCs encompass a diverse set of organisations and are not clearly defined by international law (paragraph 77).[5] We use ‘PMC’ in a general sense in this report to mean a private company (or set of companies) that sells military services in exchange for compensation. Although the Wagner Network is often described as a PMC, we acknowledge that it is not one in the conventional sense of the term in the UK, given the network’s i) illegal status in Russia;[6] ii) close relationship with the Russian state,[7] and iii) extensive activities outside the defence sphere, with evidence of economic, electoral and influencing operations (paragraph 14).
5. Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine confirmed many long-standing but contested assumptions about the Wagner Network: namely, that it operated with a high level of support from, and co-operation with, the Russian Ministry of Defence (paragraph 8); that it has been primarily state-funded; and that the Russian government facilitated its activities directly,[8] despite its illegal status as an arms-length body that has provided plausible deniability for the Russian Government. Wagner’s activities in Ukraine—
- ↑ Speaking in relation to network’s previous activities, the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism noted that its objectives “are the Russian Federation’s objectives. Wagner pursues its activities with an eye towards advancing Russia’s national security interests in two primary ways: 1) undermining democracy, and; 2) benefiting from the profits derived from the exploitation the natural resources it has gained access to. […] In doing this, the Wagner Group gains access to important resources that advance Russia’s geopolitical interests.” Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Middlebury Institute of International Studies (WGN0023)
- ↑ President Putin recently stated that the Russian state “fully financed” the Group and provided over 86 billion rubles (approx. $940 million) from May 2022 to May 2023. ‘Putin admits Kremlin gave Wagner nearly $1 billion in the past year’, POLITICO, 27 June 2023
- ↑ In 2021, UN experts detailed the Russian military cargo flights that had “become routine” since Wagner’s first deployment to Libya in October 2020 and judged that Wagner “does not have indigenous logistic resources to allow the organization to operate independently on major deployments. It requires external hybrid commercial and military logistic support, in particular aviation and maritime assets, to deploy and sustain its operations.” Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2021) addressed to the President of the Security Council S/2021/229, Annex 77, para 10
- ↑ For instance, see Qq34–35 [Christo Grozev]. Also see this investigation by Bellingcat, The Insider and Der Spiegel, which showed Prigozhin’s disinformation, political and military operations to be integrated with the Russian Military of Defence and its intelligence arm, the GRU. Bellingcat, ‘Putin Chef’s Kisses of Death: Russia’s Shadow Army’s State-Run Structure Exposed’, 14 August 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023). On the many links between Wagner and the Russian military establishment, see CSIS, ‘Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State | Center for Strategic and International Studies’, 21 September 2020 (accessed 16 July 2023)
- ↑ The same goes for the broader term, ‘Private Military and Security Companies’ (PMSCs).
- ↑ Qq8–9 [Christo Grozev]; Q96 [Mikhail Khodorkovsky]
- ↑ Henry Jackson Society (WGN0020)
- ↑ For example, its recruitment of fighters from Russian prisons and the Russian Ministry of Defence’s supply of ammunition to Wagner fighters.
