Cite as 329 Ark. 143 (1997)
The following states have addressed the issue of a seller's liability and have expressly declined to recognize common-law liability: Delaware: Samson v. Smith, 560 A.2d 1024 (Del. Supr. 1989) (no common-law liability for supplier of alcohol, such a rule is desirable; however, responsibility of legislature); Kansas: Mills v. City of Overland Park, 837 P.2d 370 (Kan. 1992) (if liability is to be imposed, it is a decision of the legislature); Maryland: Felder v. Butler, 438 A.2d 494 (Md. 1981) (only legislature can properly address issue); Nebraska: Pelzek v. American Legion, 463 N.W.2d 321 (Neb. 1990) (liability is a question of public policy better left to the legislature); Nevada: Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 450 P.2d 358 (Nev. 1969) (status as a minority view on this issue is not a rational basis to abrogate the common-law rule of nonliability).
Several states' legislatures have enacted statutes imposing dramshop liability. The following states courts have found that there is no co-existing common-law liability and that the dramshop statutes govern all liability of sellers: Alabama: Ala Code § 65-71 91975); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-102 (1985); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-11-1 (1956). Conversely, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, and Utah currently have dramshop statutes; those states' courts have found the existence of common-law liability as well. Citations, supra. The States of Vermont and Virginia have not addressed this issue.
[2] Under the existing common-law rule, no cause of action exists against one selling liquor because the drinking of liquor, not the remote sale of it, is considered to be the proximate cause of any injury. See, 48A C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, § 553 (1969); 97 A.L.R.3d 528, § 2 (1980). This strict nonliability rule that keeps the issue of a vendor's illegal sale of alcohol to a minor from a jury takes away the basic jury function of determining proximate cause. We have long held that questions of foreseeability and causation may be ones of fact, depending on the case. See, Larson Mach., Inc. v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1 (1980); Brinkley Car Works & Mfg. Co. v. Cooper, 60 Ark. 545, 31 S.W. 154 (1895). Usually, however, proximate causation is a question for the jury. Larson Mach., Inc. v. Wallace, supra. Like any
