the Monopoly Scheme never protested against Central policies. Joshi also pointed out the corruption that was rampant in the management of the Scheme, which he maintained was responsible for its failure. The corruption used to start from the purchase of cotton itself. The quantity supplied by the farmer was always shown to be much higher on paper than it actually was; the additional amount shown as payable to farmer was in fact siphoned off by those running the system. As such, the stock of cotton in the books of the Scheme was always more than the actual stock; it used to become necessary to find some excuse at the end of the year to make up for this deficit. Farmers used to say jokingly that the accounts of the Scheme could never be finalized without some fire taking place in their warehouses; which was the way of explaining the deficit in actual stock! The process of ginning was done by the private ginning mills. While giving contracts to those mills, money would change hands. The Scheme was heavily overstaffed. The job of cotton procurement was seasonal. But the staff earmarked for that would be on the payroll for the entire year! Most people were employed on the recommendation of one politician or the other. They naturally did not want to streamline the system which would make them redundant. As such, the administrative costs were very high; with private traders it was about 70 to 80 rupees per quintal of cotton, whereas with the Monopoly Scheme it was double of that. Even in the last stage of selling the cotton there was wide scope for corruption. Textile Mill owners earlier used to keep stock of minimum two to three months to ensure that their production did not suffer by sudden lack of cotton. But with the Monopoly Scheme, that need for maintaining adequate stock got totally eliminated. They could go the Scheme warehouses When White Gold Turned Red
Q
157
