against whom Bijapuris and rival Maratha chiefs, Shaista Khan and Jaswant Singh, had toiled in vain. The Deccan had been the grave of many a reputation, and he had the failures of his predecessors before
him. Shiva had already established a name for stratagem, and his Mavles had measured swords with the best regular troops on more than equal terms. Then, again, there was the likelihood that the arrival
of a large Mughal force in the Deccan would alarm Bijapur and Golkonda and throw them into the arms of Shiva to make a common cause against the invader from the north. Jai Singh, therefore, could not give
undivided attention to the Marathas: he had to keep an eye on Bijapur too. The problem before him was no easy one. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Not for a moment, in day or night, do I seek rest or ease
from being busy about the task on which I have been sent." We see from his letters how he employed every possible device for dealing with an enemy, how wide-awake and full of many-sided activity he was, how he looked far ahead, and how he handled his
miscellaneous Delhi MS.) and certain other letters given in Khatut-i-Shivaji (R.A.S. MS.) Some of these have been translated by me in the Modern Review. A.N. 887-907, though contemporary and authentic, has no independent value after the use of the above materials. Storia, ii. 120-125, 132-137, gives Manucci's personal experience of the war. Bernier, 190 (meagre.) The Marathi chronicles, Sabh. 38-46, Chit. 101-107, and Dig. 236-241, contain later and partly legendary accounts, but are our only authority for the doings of the Marathas.
