because God wills it, and this being so, he can always bring it about that evil should be good. But such reasoning is about as conclusive as if I said : It is because God wills to be God that he is God ; therefore it is in his power not to be God, which is absurdity itself. Furthermore, when people do anything, and they are asked why they do it, their answer is, because it is what justice demands. If the question is then put, why justice, or rather the first cause of all that is just, *makes such a demand,* then the answer must be, because justice wills it so. But, dear me, I think to myself, could Justice really be other than just? By no means, for then it could not be Justice. Those, however, who say that God does all that he does because it is good in itself, these, I say, may possibly think that they do not differ from us. But that is far from being the case, since they suppose that there is something before God[1] to which he has duties or obligations, namely, a cause [through] which [God] desires that this shall be good, and, again, that that shall be just.[2]
Then comes the further controversy, namely, whether God, supposing all things had been created by him in some other way from eternity, or had been ordered and predetermined to be otherwise than they now are, whether, I say, he would then be just as perfect *as he is now.* To this it may serve as an answer, that if Nature had, from all eternity, been made different from what it is now, then, from the standpoint of those who ascribe to God will and under standing, it would necessarily follow that God had a different will and a different understanding then,[3] in consequence of which he would have made it different; and so we should be compelled to think that God[4] has a different character
