an Idea of our willing this or that, and therefore only a mode of thought, a thing of Reason, and not a real thing, nothing can be caused by it; for out of nothing, nothing comes. And so, as we have shown that the will is not a thing in Nature, but only in fancy, I also think it unnecessary to ask whether the will is free or not free.
I say this not [only] of will in general, which we have shown to be a mode of thought, but also of the particular act of willing this or that, which act of willing some have identified with affirmation and denial. Now this should be clearly evident to every one who only attends to what we have already said. For we have said[1] that the under-
view. But, to conclude, I have no inclination to adduce all my objections against positing a created finite substance. I shall only show briefly that the Freedom of the Will does not in any way accord with such an enduring creation; namely, that the same activity tt is required of God in order to maintain *a thing* in existence as to create it, and that otherwise the thing could not last for a moment; as this is so, nothing can be attributed to it.ttt But we must say that God has created it just as it is; for as it has no power to maintain itself in existence while it exists, much less, then, can it produce something by itself. If, therefore, any one should say that the soul produces the volition from itself, then I ask, by what power? Not by that which has been, for it is no more; also not by that which it has now, for it has none at all whereby it might exist or last for a single moment, because it is continuously created anew. Thus, then, as there is no thing that has any power to maintain itself, or to produce anything, there remains nothing but to conclude that God alone, therefore, is and must be the efficient cause of all things, and that all acts of Volition are determined by him *alone.*
tt B: ... such an enduring creation [as they admit; for, if one and the same activity ...
ttt B: ... as this is so, no causality can be attributed to the thing.
- ↑ In B this paragraph begins thus: "Now in order to understand whether we are really free, or not free in any particular act of willing, that is of affirming or denying this or that, we must recall to our memory what we have already said, namely, ..."
