Cite as 562 F.2d 1157 (1977)
“The Sheldon case did make reference to and relied upon a report of the House Committee on the Copyright Act (309 U.S. at 400, 60 S.Ct. 681), which said that where both profits and damages had been ascertained the court could award the greater amount but not both. But that statement was superseded by the majority opinion in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Acts, 344 U.S. 228, 234, 73 S.Ct. 222, 97 L.Ed. 276 (1952). This distinguished the Sheldon case specifically, holding that the only question before the court in Sheldon had been apportionment of profits from an infringing motion picture, and that the case did not stand for the proposition that where profits were established the ‘in lieu’ provision did not come into play. Further support for the view that Sheldon does not stand for the point cited by the district court is the dissenting opinion in Woolworth which quotes the same provision from the House Committee report which was rejected in the majority opinion. We conclude that Sheldon is not authority for the rule stated in conclusion of law 4, and that, since the opinion in Woolworth, Sheldon does not stand for the proposition that where both profits and damages can be ascertained the court should award the higher but not both and should decline to resort to the ‘in lieu’ provision.”
In Runge v. Lee, 161 U.S.P.Q. 770 (C.D.Cal.1969), aff’d 441 F.2d 579 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887, 92 S.Ct. 197, 30 L.Ed.2d 169 (1971). The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in a copyright infringement action and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages of $80,000. The district court later held an accounting of profits and determined that defendant’s profits attributable to the infringement amounted to $64,253. But the court awarded plaintiff only “the higher of the two” figures. 161 U.S.P.Q. at 772. Plaintiff, however, did not claim both damages and profits, and it is clear that neither the district court nor this court considered the damage issue.
It is significant that the Second Circuit also did not feel constrained by its early precedent establishing alternative recovery. Indeed, Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194 (2 Cir. 1964), which established the cumulative rule, did not even mention Underwood Typewriter. It seems clear that the Second Circuit concluded that Underwood Typewriter, like Sheldon, was no longer good law after Woolworth. I agree.
The cumulative recovery rule is supported by the recent general revision of the Copyright Act. Act of October 19, 1976, Publ.L.No.94–553, 90 Stat. 2541, amending 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1909). Section 504(b) thereof provides in part:
“The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.”
The new Act thus makes it explicit that the plaintiff is entitled to both actual damages and additional profits realized by the defendant from the infringement. See H.R. Rep.No.94–1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 161 (1976); S.Rep.No.94–473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 143–44 (1976); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 5659. This court should view this new Act as indicative of Congressional intent in this area, see N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974), and follow the cumulative recovery rule.
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the Opinion by Judge Carter on infringement and concurs in the Opinion by Judge Sneed on damages.
