Page:Simpson v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC.pdf/6

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Cite as 2014 Ark. 363

Cavalry disagrees with Simpson's interpretation and would have this court interpret section 17-24-101 to not apply to Cavalry because it "assigned" its collection activity to a law firm. Therefore, Cavalry alleges that it was not "directly" attempting to collect a debt. This argument lacks merit and is misleading. Cavalry did not "assign" the debt to a law firm but "retained" (as framed in the certified question by the Eastern District) a law firm to act on its behalf in collecting the debt, including the filing of a lawsuit.

Section 17-24-102 lends additional support for Simpson's plain-language interpretation of section 17-24-101. Section 17-24-102(a)(8) only exempts attorneys who are collecting indebtedness that is owed to them individually or as a firm, and section 17-24-102(b) explains that the attorneys licensed to practice in Arkansas are not required to be licensed when they are "engaged in rendering legal services for clients in the collection of accounts, debts, or claims." Therefore, without section 17-24-102(b), an attorney who filed suit in his or her own name to collect a debt of another would be required to obtain a license. Thus, the additional language in section 17-24-102(b) explains that the "clients" are the individuals "in the collection" of the debt, and the attorneys are simply "rendering legal services" on behalf of their clients and are exempt from the licensure requirement.

Furthermore, Cavalry's interpretation would have this court infer that the definition of collection agency would include only "direct" attempts and not any "indirect" attempts to collect. However, the plain language of section 17-24-101 does not include any modifying language and would thus include both direct and indirect attempts to collect delinquent accounts or bills. Without evidence of a drafting omission, this court will not read into

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