law from the will of nations, there are only these three kinds of the positive law of nations.'
" This excellent author, after having stated the volun- tary law of nations, to he the result of the equality of nations, and the conventional law, to he particular com- pacts or treatises, binding only on the contracting par- ties, declares, tlmt the customary law of nations is only binding to those nations that have adopted it: that it is a particular and not an universal law; that it applies only to distinct nations. The case of Alexander and the Thebans is founded on the general law of nations, applicable to nations at war. It is enough for me then to show, that America, being at war, was entitled to the privilege of national law. But, says Vattel, the present state of European refinement, controuls the general law (of which he had been before speaking.) We know that the customary law of nations can only bind those ivho are paHies to tJie custom. In the year 1776, when America announced her will to be free, or in the year 1777, when the law concerning British debts passed, was there a customary law of America, to this effect.-^ Or were the customaiy laws of Europe binding on Am£rica? Were ive a party to any such customary law? Was there any thing in our constitution or laws, which tied up our hands .^ No, sir. To make this customary law obligatory, the assent of all the parties to be bound by it is necessary. There must be an interchange of it. It is not for one nation or community to say to another, you are bound by this law, because mir Jiingdom approves of it. It must not only be reci- procal in its advantages and principles, but it must have been reciprocal in its exercise. Virginia could not, therefore, be bound by it. Let us see whether it could be a hard case on the British creditors, that this cus-
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