magnanimity you have appreciated in peace. Mr. Greeley, in his "History of the Rebellion," says emphatically, these were "the very darkest hours of our contest—those in which our loyal people most profoundly despaired of its successful issue."[1] Swinton, a shrewd observer and candid historian, says: "So gloomy was the military outlook after the action on the Chickahominy, and to such a degree by consequence had the moral spring of the public mind become relaxed, that there was at this time great danger of a collapse of the war." And he adds, significantly: "The archives of the State Department, when one day made public, will show how deeply the Government was affected by the want of military success, and to what resolutions the Executive had in consequence come."[2] But, alas! the "success elsewhere," of which the historian speaks, had "come to brighten the horizon," and, continuing, quickened into vigorous action the vast resources of the North.
Grant, reinforced by over thirty thousand men at Spotsylvania,[3] was heavily reinforced again; and putting aside with great firmness the well known wishes of the Federal Executive, prepared to change his strategy for the fifth time, and
ASSAIL RICHMOND FROM THE SOUTH.
It was a determination based upon the soundest military principles, for from that direction could an assailant hope to bring to bear with greatest assurance of success that cardinal maxim of military strategy, "operate on the communications of the enemy without endangering your own." Though the plan was now for the first time to be put to the test, it was no new conception. McClellan had proposed it to Halleck,[4] when that General visited the Army of the Potomac after what was euphemistically termed "its strategic change of base to the James," but the Chief of the Staff curtly rejected it as "impracticable." Lee, cautious of speech, had not hesitated to say to friends here in Richmond that the good people of the town might go to their beds without misgiving, so long as the enemy assailed the Capital north and east, and left unvexed his communications with the Carolinas. General
- ↑ He embraces period from Cold Harbor to Crater, inclusive.
- ↑ Swinton, p. 495, note.
- ↑ As the Secretary of War denies access to the archives at Washington, it is impossible to state the precise figures. Mr. Stanton in his report says: "Meanwhile, in order to repair the losses of the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of the force designed to guard the Middle Department (Baltimore) and the Department of Washington (in all 47,751 men) was called forward to the front."
- ↑ Memorandum of Halleck (July 27th, 1862), in Report on Conduct War, Part I, p. 454.
