battle on the ground where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manoeuvred in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac.
"3d. The way in which the fights of the 2d of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which insured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville.
"4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the 2d, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meades' communications with Washington.
"5th. The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett on the 3d should never have been made. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps could not co-operate with it as it would have done had the attack taken place early in the morning. I hesitate very much between these two opinions."
I respond seriatim, and as concisely as I can, to his questions.
To the first and second, I may say, as far as I know and believe, the invasion of the North, at the time referred to, resulted from four reasons-viz: 1st. The difficulties lying in the path of an attack upon the Federal army in its chosen position in this (Stafford) county after Chancellorsville. 2d. The desire to manoeuvre it to a safer distance from the Confederate capital. 3d. The knowledge that a decisive battle fought in Maryland or Pennsylvania would in all probability have given us the former State with large accessions to our ranks from a sympathizing population, while Washington, the capital of our opponents, would have necessarily fallen—a prize the moral effect of which cannot be overestimated. I believe it was General Lee's original plan to strike the Federal army at the most favorable point as soon as he heard they had
