Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 06.djvu/41

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31
Relative Numbers at Gettysburg.

to 10,440 at the battle, thus disposing of near 6,000, while he is only willing to allow for a loss of 1,100 in battle in Stuart's cavalry, and 1,606 more from other causes. Now, if Pleasonton's cavalry had been reduced by the casualties in battle and the wear and tear of the campaign, when the government furnished new horses to the dismounted men, from 16,300 to 12,000 (the figure at which I put it at Gettysburg), is it unreasonable to assume that Stuart's cavalry had been reduced in the same ratio during the same period—that is, from 10,292 to 7,500, thus giving Stuart 4,000 in the three brigades with him, and 3,500 with Robertson and Jones?

The Comte de Paris must not be surprised if he is suspected of not treating this question of numbers with the impartiality that is demanded of a historian.

General Fitz. Lee, as shown by the first part of his very clever article on the battle of Gettysburg, in the April number of the Papers, has permitted himself to be misled by Federal officers as to the numbers on their side at the battle. In a note referring to Colonel Taylor's estimate of the strength of the two armies, he says: "The Federal force is overestimated. Their total of all arms was about 90,000. General Humphreys puts, in a letter to me, the Federal infantry at 70,000, inclusive of 5,000 officers."

By reference to the abstracts I have given, the accuracy of which he can verify, if he thinks proper, by inquiry at the Adjutant-General's office, General Fitz. Lee will see that in the seven corps of the Army of the Potomac, there were, on the 30th of June, 5,286 officers and 71,922 enlisted men, making a total of 77,208 "Present for duty equipped"—that is, ready to go into a fight; and when Lockwood's and Stannard's brigades were added on the morning of the 2d July, there were 82,208 officers and men in the infantry available for duty in the line of battle. This should satisfy him that his other estimates, founded on testimony similar to that adduced on this point, in regard to the force available to oppose an advance by us after the close of the fight on the 1st, are fallacious. By reference to the return of July the 10th, he will find that the Eleventh corps had still 6,895 officers and men for duty, and the First corps 4,792, after the losses not only of the first day, but also of the second and third, though there had been no additions to either corps after the battle, and Stannard's brigade, which joined the First corps on the second day, had departed because of the expiration of its term of service.

I will not continue the discussion with him of the propriety and