convinced, by information sent him by myself from Rough-and-Ready, that the enemy were moving on that place. He then determined to attack what he believed to be two corps of the enemy at Jonesboro'. The enemy had reached Jonesboro' before the order was given to move against him. I was telegraphed at Rough-and-Ready, in the evening of August 30th, to come to Atlanta, and an engine was sent for me. I arrived in the night. General Hood ordered me to move with Lee's corps and my own, commanded by Major-General Cleburne, to Jonesboro', and to attack and if possible drive the enemy across Flint river. The troops were in vicinity of Eastpoint, and were put in motion at once. I left Atlanta by rail and reached Jonesboro' before daybreak, expecting to find Lee and Cleburne there. To my disappointment I found that Cleburne, who was in advance, had encountered the enemy in force upon the road which he had been instructed to take, and had been compelled to open another road. This occasioned great delay. Cleburne got into position about nine A. M. and Lee not until eleven A. M. Three brigades of Lee, which had been left on picket, did not get up until 1.30 P. M.
Foreseeing that the attack could not be made before the afternoon, and that the enemy would have time, by entrenching himself, to add strength of position to superiority of numbers, I telegraphed these facts to General Hood early in the day, and urged him to come to Jonesboro' and take command. Communication with Atlanta by rail was then still open, but he did not come.
As soon as the lines could be adjusted, I ordered the attack. Lee's corps was on the right. Cleburne had orders to turn the enemy's right flank, and Lee to begin the attack when he should hear Cleburne's guns. Lee, mistaking the guns of Cleburne's skirmishers for the main attack, began the movement before Cleburne became seriously engaged. He encountered formidable breastworks, which he was unable to carry, and after considerable loss was driven back in confusion. Cleburne had carried the temporary works of the enemy and a portion of his command had crossed Flint river and captured two pieces of artillery, which he was unable, however, to bring over the river. He was now moving upon the enemy's main works. I sent my Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Roy, to Lieutenant-General Lee to ascertain whether his troops were in condition to renew the attack. General Lee expressed the decided opinion that they were not. Immediately after this I was informed by another staff officer, Colonel Pickett, that the enemy were preparing to attack Lee. In view of the demoralized condition of Lee's troops, as reported by the same officer, I withdrew a division from Cleburne to support Lee. It now became necessary for me to act on the defensive, and I ordered Cleburne to make no further attempts upon the enemy's works.
It is proper to state that the enemy were strongly entrenched, and had one flank resting on Flint river, and both well protected. Their fortifications had been erected during the day and night pre-
