36 Southern Historical Society Papers.
eral officer that the capture was made near Georgetown.) A staff officer ot" General Beauregard's undertook to learn the signals, had himself dressed in Federal uniform and incarcerated with the prisoner. He made the Federal believe that he was a Yankee just captured and had succeeded in hiding away in his boot the signal book. Said the Confederate, "I had just received an appointment in the signal corps, but was captured before I learnt enough to be of any service. As I have managed to keep my book, we can improve the time by your teaching me the signals. When we are exchanged I will be of some use."
The Federal officer, completely deceived, fell into the trap so art- fully set for him. He found an apt scholar. It was not long before the Federal system of signals was thoroughly understood by a Con- federate officer capable of imparting his knowledge to our whole signal corps. The two officers were separated, the Federal in igno- rance of the fact that his pupil was soon to be set to work teaching the Confederates to read the Federal signals.
Late in the afternoon of to day (nth Julyj one of the signal corps brought Colonel Simonton a dispatch which they had interpreted, as the enemy's signal officers were sending it from Gilmore, command- ing the land forces, to Admiral Dahlgreen, commanding the fieet. It was a request that the Admiral would furnish him with one hundred boats to be manned by the land forces, and to be used in attacking Secessionville, across the marsh by way of the creeks from Folley Island. The attack was to be made before morning. Our engineers had never contemplated the possibility of attack from that direction, and had constructed no defences of any kind on the water front. The creek, which runs by the peninsula on which the village was built, reaches for forty or fifty yards to the high land and then recedes very gradually. A substantial wharf was built where the creek touched the high land. At high water there is from five to eight feet of water in the creek. There is considerable water in it at all stages of the tide. There is nothing by way of dtfence between us and the enemy at night except a boat picket of three or four men. But for this notice of the intention of the enemy to move on us, such an attack as had been planned would almost certainly have been successful if made with boldness and energy. The enemy could have formed along our water front almost as quickly as our troops could have been gotten under arms. If our boat pickets could have been secured so that no alarm would have been given we might have been taken completely by surprise. As soon as the information was received I assembled
