/". 6 I : n;l. 323
Colonels Harris and Stephens, of the engineers. They acquainted him with the exact state of affairs in our front, and also gave him a succinct account of the last engagements up to the I2th, between Grant and Lee, with the then position of those armies. Instantly devising a scheme for the co-operative action of his own and Gen- eral Lee's army, Beauregard dispatched Colonel Stephens to Rich- mond for the purpose of submitting it to Mr. Davis and asking his permission to carry it out. Mr. Davis could not be seen, but Gen- eral Bragg, then occupying the position of Chief of Staff, came im- mediately to Drewry's for conference upon the subject, and gave the scheme his unreserved approval, while stating that he could not command its execution without first consulting the President.
DAVIS DISAPPROVES BEAUREGARD's SCHEME.
Mr. Davis arrived in person at Drewry's between 8 and 9 o'clock that morning, and giving grave attention to the proposition, disap- proved it. Observing that General Lee, now at Guinea Station, above Richmond, and himself, at Drewry's, below, occupied the in- terior line, Beauregard's plan was that General Lee should fall back upon the defence of the Capital; that 10,000 of his men should in the meantime be swiftly transferred to Drewry's, together with the 5,000 now at Richmond under Ransom; that upon the arrival of this reinforcement, raising his command to 25,000 effectives. Beau- regard should at daybreak on the 15th, attack Butler on his right flank, so as to cut him off" from his base at Bermuda Hundred; while General Whiting with some 4,000 men moving simultaneously from Walthall Junction, should strike Butler's right rear, and pressing him back upon the James, force a surrender. Beauregard should then, by a concerted movement, throw his victorious force across the river, and strike Grant upon his left flank, while General Lee should attack him in front. The feasibility of these movements seem to have been conceded. The moral effect upon the people of an apparent retreat by Lee, and the impairment of the prestige of his heroic troops, were considerations urged against the manceuvre. Beauregard claimed that it was better for the army to take a volun- tary temporary step rearward, in order to foil the design of its ad- versary, as proposed, than to passively maintain the strategic de- fensive, and follow the movements of the enemy without making any possible headway against him.
It is generally useless to speculate upon the " might have been,"
