General Lee's Strategy at Chancellor sville. 23
2nd. A close examination of this map shows that even the by- road suggested by Dr. Lacy as a cut-off was already laid down on Campbell's map, as well as the roads which were followed by the Second corps on May 2nd, 1903, and there is no material difference in the roads around Chancellorsville, as laid down by Campbell before the battle, and as shown by Hotchkiss on his map, which was made after the bottle.
With Campbell's map before them on the night of May ist, and the position of General Hooker ascertained, as I have shown it thereon, there is no reason why General Lee should not have been able to indicate to General Jackson the route to Hooker's rear by the Furnace and Brock roads, as stated by Colonel Mar- shall, and the fact that General Jackson did follow the route indicated by General Lee is fully established not only by Hotch- kiss' map, published in 1867, but by official maps, and by Gen- eral Lee's official report.
I have, I think, shown that the evidence is all against Hotch- kiss' account of how the movement of Jackson around Hooker originated, and that Dr. Dabney's claim that General Jackson "proposed," the movement rests on the meaning of the word "undertook." as used 1 by General Lee in his letter to Mrs. Jack- son, while ( leneral Lee has himself stated in no uncertain (lan- guage :
firs/. That he and he alone was responsible for the opera- tions of the Confederates.
Second. That when he overtook General Jackson on the evening of May ist, he decided against an attack in front, and stated to him that "we must attack on our left as soon as possi- ble."
Third. That it was resolved that night to turn Hooker's right flank and gain his rear.
Fourth. That the execution of this plan was entrusted to General Jackson, who undertook to throw his command in Hooker's rear.
Fifth. That early on the morning of May 2nd, General Jackson marched by the Furnace and Brock roads.
