disclose our plans") no longer existed, for evidently the enemy had discovered Lee's northern movement and were following him; and, second, that General Lee's permission to pass around the rear of the Federal army did not apply to the situation now developed when the Federal army had left Virginia. He had permission to make that movement only if there was no "hindrance" in the way. To take that course now (after June 25th), would completely prevent the main object of his expedition, which was to "join the right of the army in Pennsylvania" on its march "towards the Susquehanna."
These observations receive support from the comment of an able and accomplished military critic, Captain Cecil Battine. In his "Crisis of the Confederacy," (1905), he says, referring to General Stuart's raid:
"By the light of what happened, it may now be said that the raid was a mistake, and especially when Stuart found the Federal army to be moving northward did he commit an error of judgment in attempting to traverse its lines of communication, thus severing his connection with Lee at the crisis of the campaign." P. 156.
"Balancing what might be gained against what was certain to be lost for the invading army by the absence of the best half of the Cavalry with its distinguished Chief, the same judgment must be made as Jackson pronounced on Stoneman's raid six weeks earlier." P. 158.
"Having acquired this knowledge (that the Federal army was marching north), Stuart would certainly have done well to have marched up the right bank of the Potomac and so made sure of rejoining the army, but his character was not one to lightly abandon an enterprize which he had once undertaken." P. 160.
Col. Henderson, the distinguished author of the Life of Stonewall Jackson, is of the same opinion. He says: "Stuart forgot for once that to cover the march of the army and to send in timely information are services of far greater importance than cutting the enemy's communications and harassing his rear." "The Science of War." P. 303.
