thickest of the fight, made him the idol of his troopers. To him, if to anyone, would the words apply:
"From plume to spear a cavalier,
Whose soul ne'er parleyed with a fear,
Nor cheek bore tinge of shame."
Did he now fail Lee in the hour of supremest need?
Did he violate instructions upon which the safety and welfare of the army depended? The answer to the latter question must be determined from the records, and to these we will briefly refer.
On June 20th, General Lee's headquarters were at Berryville, on the road from Snicker's Gap to Winchester. On the 22d, the first and third corps being within reach, he addressed a letter to General Ewell, telling him if he was ready to move, to do so. The letter advised Ewell that his best course would be toward the Susquehanna, taking the routes by Emmittsburg, Chambers-burg, and McConnellsburg, and that the trains, if possible, should be kept on the centre route, and the cavalry should be used in gathering supplies, obtaining information and protecting his flanks. "It will depend (said General Lee), upon the quantity of supplies obtained in that country, whether the rest of the army can follow. There may be enough for your command, but none for the others. Every exertion should, therefore, be made to locate and secure them. Beef we can drive with us, but bread we cannot carry, and must secure it in the country." The letter farther added that his progress and direction should depend upon the development of circumstances; "If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it." A. P. Hill, the letter announced, had arrived the day before in the vicinity of Berryville, and would be moved on immediately: that Longstreet had withdrawn from the Blue Ridge, and that on the day before the enemy had pressed the cavalry so hard that McLaws' division had to be sent back to hold Ashby's Gap.
Later on the same day, at 3:30 P. M., Lee sent Ewell the following letter:
"I have just received your letter of this morning from opposite Shepherdstown. Mine of today, authorizing you to move
