pected the attack to be made early is certain; he was on the ground at daybreak July 2d, and showed some impatience at Longstreet's failure to attack, saying to one of his officers: "Longstreet is so slow." Captain Poague, of the artillery, in a letter addressed to Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, says that "at 9 A. M., southwest of Big Round Top, I ran across General Lee riding through the woods. He said: 'Have you seen General Longstreet or any of his troops in this neighborhood?' and expressed impatience and disappointment, adding: 'I wonder where Longstreet can be.'" Conclusive proof that Longstreet knew he was expected to attack at an early hour is found in the fact that both Hood and McLaws moved at daybreak and were in position to attack at sunrise.
As to the prospects of success had an attack been made early, the English military critic already referred to says: "There can be no doubt that the opportunity was the brightest the Confederates had made for themselves since they let McClellan escape from the banks of the Chickahominy." "One-third of the Federal army had been severely defeated: the remainder were concentrating with difficulty, by forced marches; a prompt employment of all his available forces would have placed victory within Lee's grasp. The resolution to attack was therefore sound and wise; the failure lay not in the plan but in the faults of execution which were caused to some extent by the want of sympathetic cooperation by the corps commanders."
Colonel Henderson says that at daylight of July 2d there were no more than 40,000 men present on the Union front, and that the Confederate attack should have been made at that hour. Only four of the seven corps of Meade's army were present and two of them had been roughly handled the day before. By 8 o'clock two more had come up, making in all some 55,000 men. Longstreet's course must be pronounced inexplicable and inexcusable. Instead of cheerfully co-operating with the plan of his great leader, he undertook to argue the question; and Henderson says, Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg because he allowed his second in command to argue instead of marching! The statement of Col. Henderson is confirmed by Major Steele in his well known work on American campaigns. He says, (p. 373),
