Page:Speech of Mr. Chas. Hudson, of Mass., on the Three Million Appropriation Bill - delivered in the House of Representatives of the U.S., Feb. 13, 1847 (IA speechofmrchashu00hudsrich).pdf/12

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that there is a vast difference between a state of peace and a state of war; but I have yet to learn that we must bring to the Constitution of our country any rule of interpretation in war that would not be sound in time of peace. Congress is the law-making power at all times—in war no less than in peace. There are strong reasons why Congress should be more watchful of their prerogative in war than in peace. War, from the necessity of the case, increases Executive patronage, and greatly augments Executive power. This department of the Government is never so dangerous to our liberties as when clad in armor. It is then, more especially, that the people's Representatives should take an independent stand, and bring into exercise all those checks and balances, which our patriot fathers have wisely provided for in the Constitution.

Nothing can be more alarming nothing more dangerous to our liberties than the views which some gentlemen appear to entertain on this subject. If we must give the President whatever he asks, simply because we are engaged in war, it would be an easy thing for some modern Caesar, or second Napoleon, to raise himself to supreme command in this nation. Suppose some master-spirit should be raised to the Presidency, and he should aspire at absolute power, what would it be necessary for him to do? Simply to involve the nation in a war, and then Congress must give all the men and all the money his ambition might require. He would, under the pretence of conquering a peace," augment the military force under his command, until he had a power sufficient to establish for himself a military despotism on the ruins of our free institutions. Gentlemen may smile at this, and think there is no danger. So Rome thought when she was granting supplies to Caesar in Gaul; but the very force put into his hands enabled him to triumph over her liberties.

But some gentlemen may say that we mistake the character of the law of war. When Congress declare war, that becomes the law of the land—a law which is not repealable by Congress like other statutes. I know, sir, that this position is substantially true; I am aware that when war is made, it can only be completely terminated by a treaty of peace, and that in this treaty, the President has the initiative. But this very fact shows the necessity of our acting with great caution, both in declaring war, and in granting means for its prosecution. The very fact that war increases Executive power, should teach us not to surrender to him powers not granted by the Constitution. It also admonishes us so to exercise our prerogative over the sinews of war, as to maintain a just balance of power. But we are told that the laws of war must be obeyed by the people arid the people's Representatives. I readily admit that we must obey all laws, and submit to all legal authority. But I should like to know what law we violate, when we deny to the President any grant he may ask of us? Is there any law, fundamental or otherwise, which requires us to do his bidding in all things? I should like to be informed, by some of my good Democratic friends, what law they violated, when they voted down the bill providing for a lieutenant-general; or whether they can be regarded as law-breakers, because they rejected the Executive recommendation of a tax upon tea and coffee? Or, suppose they had succeeded in converting the ten regiment bill into a grant to employ volunteers, rather than regulars, would they stand justly charged with violating the laws of the land?

The fact is, Congress has full jurisdiction over this whole subject, in war and in peace; and may grant to the Executive what means they may judge