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now become an ordinary power in the hands of the President, and no Chief Magistrate has ever been guilty of a greater abuse of it than the present incumbent of the White House. This abuse of the veto power justly merits the rebuke of Congress. But his conduct in relation to this war is still more reprehensible. And it becomes those to whom the people have entrusted their rights to assert their prerogative, and curb the mad ambition of the Executive. I would not withhold supplies on any ordinary occasion. But I maintain that the present is not an ordinary occasion. The President, who had sworn to support a Constitution which denies to him the war-making power, by giving it to Congress alone, ordered our army into the territory of a nation with which we were at peace, and thus commenced hostilities without the consent of Congress, though they were then in session, and could have been consulted at any moment. We have seen the President, after he had commenced this unnecessary war, come before the very Congress whose prerogative he had invaded, with a declaration that "Mexico had invaded the United States, and shed American blood upon American soil"—a declaration which has been shown over and over again, to be totally at variance with the facts in the case. In his Message of May 11, 1846, the President gave every assurance that he had no designs of conquest, but simply sought an honorable peace. "I deem it proper to declare," says he, "that it is my anxious desire not only to terminate hostilities speedily, but to bring all matters in dispute between this Government and Mexico to an early and amicable adjustment." But as early as May15th, only four days after the President's assurance of a desire for peace, his Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Bancroft, in his orders to Commodore Sloat, discloses the intention of the Government to seize and hold California; and he directs him to "conciliate the confidence of the people in California, and also in Senora, towards the Government of the United States; and to endeavor to render their relations with the United States as friendly as possible." On the 8th of June, Mr. Bancroft instructs the Commodore as follows: "It is rumored that the province of California is well disposed to accede to friendly relations with the United States. You will encourage the people in that region (o enter into relations of amity with our country. You will take such measures as will best promote the attachment of the people of California to the United States, will advance their prosperity, and will make that vast region a desirable place of residence for emigrants from our soil. The Secretary of War, Mr. Marcy, gives similar instructions to Gen. Kearny, as early as June 3, 1846; and the famous letter of Mr. Marcy to Col. Stevenson, in relation to his California regiment, establishes the general policy of the Administration, and shows that two days after the declaration of war the President had resolved to make it a war of conquest.
The very fact that the war has been prosecuted in the remote and sparsely populated province of California, proves most conclusively that conquest alone is the object. Why attempt "to make that vast region a desirable place of residence for emigrants from our soil," unless it was to be added to the United States? It would do nothing towards subduing Mexico, to take possession of that distant province; and hence we are bound to believe, that its capture was designed as a means of holding and possessing it. In fact, Mr. Secretary Bancroft, in his letter to Commodore Sloat of July 12th, declares, that it is important to have the territory in our possession at the time of a treaty, that it may be loft in our hands. "The object of the United States," says he, "has reference to ultimate peace with Mexico; and if, at that peace, the basis of the uti possidetis should be estab-
