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hardly have 25,000 with which to commence your march for the halls of the Montezumas. How many of these would fall in the mountain passes, those Thermopylses of Mexico, before reaching the famous city, and how many would be lost in the attempt to possess it, it is impossible to say; but, judging from the resistance at Monterey, we have reason to believe that our victories would be dearly bought. In such an enterprise, we should be successful or unsuccessful. If victory crowned our arms, we should be in possession of the capital of that Republic; but what then ? If the Mexicans were united and determined to resist, this would do nothing towards subduing them. We should be in the heart of their country, where they could cut off our sup plies, and perhaps destroy our army. Our military commanders might "revel in the halls of the Montezumas," as Napoleon did in the Kremlin of the Czars, but Mexico might prove to us what Moscow did to the French in that event ful campaign. Success in reaching the city might prove to us as it did to Napoleon in that case—the destruction of all our hopes, and the loss of our gallant army. But, if we should be unsuccessful in our attack upon the city of Mexico, our army would probably be cut off. Once routed, we should find but little mercy from the Mexican population in our rear. They would rise as one man, and reak their vengeance upon our flying forces.
I am fully aware that the idea of defeat hardly enters into the calculation of those who are warmly devoted to this war. They speak of the prowess of this nation, as though we could successfully meet the world in arms. I am not insensible of our power in a war of defence-fighting for our own soil and institutions, our homes and altars, we should be invincible. But when we engage in a war of conquest, prosecuted far from our own country, and in the heart of the enemy's, the case is entirely different. The example of Napoleon in Russia, to which we have already alluded, should make us pause. The war prosecuted by Napoleon in Spain is an example in point; and Mexico or New Spain may prove to us what old Spain did to the well-appointed armies of that mighty captain. We may take possession of the cities of Mexico, and hold them as the French have held Algiers for the last fifteen years; and we may find, as France has, that the possession is not worth the cost. We may prosecute the war as we did the war in Florida, at great expense of blood and treasure; and the glory which will encircle our brow in the one case, will be as great as it has proved in the other. With an adequate force in Mexico, we may expect to lose twenty thousand, annually, during the war. And who can be indifferent to this wanton sacrifice of human life? Will the moral and religious feelings of our people acquiesce in such a murderous policy for the unholy purposes of conquest? Is new slave territory to be purchased at such a sacrifice of blood? The very idea is revolting. If we believe in an overruling Providence—if we allow that God rules in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, and punishes nations for their sins, may we not fear that his judgments will fall upon this people? Can we expect that the God of battles will crown our arms with ultimate success? We maybe prospered for a season; we may go on conquering and to conquer, till the measure of our iniquity is full; but the time will come, when this insatiate lust for dominion, this disregard of the principles of justice and humanity, will bring upon this nation the calamities which have befallen other republics.
We see in the case before us a fruitful source of discord. The war was commenced for the conquest of territory to convert into slave States. The most that the Administration, desire in the first instance; is to acquire the
