of Washington City and to prevent Mr. Lincoln's inauguration. I am led to believe by many things that there is such a plan entertained by the most desperate of Southern fire-eaters. The more the chances of the original secession movement decrease, the more will a plan like that come into prominence as their last resort. But, however vague and indefinite the rumors in circulation may be, the matter ought to be brought up before Congress, be it in the shape of a resolution calling upon the Administration to provide for such an emergency, or whatever other form. Whether such a resolution can be carried, or, if carried, will have any effect upon the Executive, is a matter of indifference. The introduction of this subject and the discussion it will necessarily draw out, will at all events serve two great objects: First, it will divert the attention of Congress from the plans of compromise and concentrate it upon subjects of practical importance. Two subjects like this and the impeachment, if well managed, will inevitably kill all concession schemes, however plausible. But the most important effect the discussion of this last point will have, is to draw the attention of the people of the North upon a danger which, at present, seems to be too little thought of.
A few days ago I addressed a letter to Governor Morgan as chairman of the National Committee, requesting him to send a circular to the different State committees and to invite them to make preparations for an escort of honor to the President on the 4th of March. As soon as the matter is broached in Congress, we may go one step further. The governors of the States may then proceed to arm and organize their militia for the emergency, and demand appropriations from their legislatures for that purpose. It may be said that the danger exists only in our imagination. I tell you, it does not; I am almost certain the attempt will be made if we are not prepared
