very face. But the inflationists, driven by the necessity of throwing dust in the eyes of the people, exhibit such an able-bodied perseverance in misstatement that I shall once more take the trouble to give the figures from an authentic statement before me.
From that statement it appears that in 1873, when the business crash occurred, there were in the aggregate more legal-tenders and bank-notes out than ever before; including the fractional currency, there were $9,000,000 more than in 1872, over $29,000,000 more than in 1871, over $52,000,000 more than in 1870, over $58,000,000 more than in 1869, over $56,000,000 more than in 1868, over $46,000,000 more than in 1867; and even if we count the compound interest notes into the volume of circulating currency we find that we had in 1873, the year of the crash, a general aggregate of $9,000,000 more than in 1872, over $29,000,000 more than in 1871, over $51,000,000 more than in 1870, over $56,000,000 more than in 1869, over $2,000,000 more than in 1868. And yet, just the years last mentioned have generally been called years of unexampled prosperity; and when during all those years the currency had reached its greatest volume, that collapse came, which the inflationists will have us believe was caused by contraction. There is the record. There was expansion, and no contraction; and if there was no contraction, then contraction cannot have caused the collapse in business. That is so simple a demonstration that I think Governor Allen should understand it. And yet I shall not be surprised to see to-morrow an inflationist come before you who, in the face of these facts and figures, will affirm that it was the contraction of the currency which did all the mischief.
What was, then, the cause of the crisis of 1873, the consequences of which are still upon us? I wonder why political economists of the inflation school will never
