that no consideration will induce them to dally with men or practices of doubtful honesty. If, on the other hand, those Departments are under the management of Secretaries who only acquiesce in the reform policy because you favor it, but, being themselves half-hearted in it, carry it on only as far as they are watched or as may be necessary to save appearances, men whose political views and habits would rather incline them to continue in the old beaten track, or who have not the necessary power of resistance against the pressure of politicians, or are naturally disposed to yield and temporize and study the art “how not to do it,”—if, in other words, the struggle for that reform is not only to be carried on by the Administration against the opposition outside, but inside of the Administration against half-heartedness or doubtful purpose—then embarrassments and failures would be likely to ensue which it is not necessary to describe. If you think it best not to appoint Bristow but can find a man of the necessary capacity answering to the first description, nothing will be lost. But the men I have seen mentioned, let me confess, answer more to the second than to the first. The Treasury Department has become particularly conspicuous in connection with the question of reform, and any appointment to that Secretaryship which appears as a “backing down” from what might be called the Bristow standard would, as I think, not only produce a bad effect upon public opinion just at the start when, after all that has happened, favor of public opinion is of particular importance to you, but may bring on further perplexities of a grave nature. I am frank to say that it appears to me difficult to find a fit substitute for Bristow to fill his place in public estimation as well as for the work to be done for the realization of your objects. I have considered it my duty as your friend to submit these views to you on a point which impresses me as one of great moment.
