common interest, the Republican Party has a sort of tacit partnership agreement—and not quite tacit either—to this effect: The party of the first part, the moneyed power, is to do all it can by way of furnishing campaign funds to be used in national elections, to keep the party of the second part, the Republican Party, in possession of the Government. The party of the second part, the Republican Party, is in return to do all it can by way of tariff legislation to keep the party of the first part, the moneyed power, in the enjoyment of large financial profits. And the larger these profits are, the more able and the more willing will be the party of the first part, the moneyed power, to furnish the party of the second part, the Republican Party, with a big corruption fund for buying the next election, expecting, of course, for itself again ample returns in the shape of still more profitably devised tariff laws. And so on.
It is true, the Republicans tell us that the McKinley tariff is the closing act, the final consummation of the protective policy, and that beyond it nothing will ever be asked. This is the old song. I know it well. This country never had a protective tariff in its whole history, before the enactment of which the people were not assured that this was the utmost measure of the demands that would be made, and after the enactment of which the clamor for more protection—higher duties—did not soon again begin. It is the experience not only of this country, but of the world, and it is in the nature of high protection. So it will be again with the McKinley tariff, if the Republicans are entrusted with full power. More will be asked for; more will be granted by the Republican party for more subsidy needed to keep the party in the possession of power. But even if the duties were not increased, the arrangement to preserve those now existing would be substantially the same.
