still in the experimental stage. No living authority can with assurance predict how the great modern battle-ships will prove themselves in actual combat. We know for a certainty only how they sink one another at maneuvering drills. Why should we waste millions and risk human lives in experiments entirely useless to us while the race between armor and ordnance is still going on, and nobody can tell whether after the first great naval engagement the unwieldy steel-plated monsters will not be discarded, as the mailed soldier has been dispensed with in consequence of the progressive perfection of the firearm? With entire safety we may content ourselves with a moderate number of swift cruisers, capable of doing high police duty, and with some floating batteries and a good supply of torpedo-boats, and other contrivances for coast defence sufficient for the first necessity, if indeed any trouble should happen.
In another respect a large navy might prove to the American people a most undesirable luxury. It would be a dangerous plaything. Its possession might excite an impatient desire to use it, and lead us into strong temptations to precipitate a conflict of arms in case of any difference with a foreign Government, which otherwise might easily be settled by amicable adjustment. The little new navy we have has already perceptibly stimulated such a spirit among some of our navy officers and civilian navy enthusiasts, who are spoiling for an opportunity to try the new guns. We remember their attitude during the late Chilian difficulty, when it was absolutely certain to any candid mind that our little sister republic would, after a little bluster, ultimately make every apology demanded. And there is no project of territorial acquisition or of “vigorous foreign policy” ever so extravagant that does not find hot advocates in navy circles. Every new warship we build will be apt further to encourage this
