Page:Spencer v. Nigrelli.pdf/18

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Case 6:22-cv-06486-JLS Document 56 Filed 12/29/22 Page 18 of 36

S.Ct. 63, 66 (2020) (such secular establishments are appropriate comparators for houses of worship).

In sum, on this record, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the State permits countless other private actors hosting secular activities to do what a house of worship may not. The houses of worship exclusion is not a neutral law of general applicability.

c. The State Fails to Satisfy Strict Scrutiny

Faced with Plaintiffs’ showing that the houses of worship exclusion burdens their sincerely held religious practices pursuant to a policy that is not neutral or generally applicable, the State must demonstrate that the exclusion survives strict scrutiny—which is “the most rigorous of scrutiny.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 546. It has not.

To satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must show that “its restrictions on the plaintiff’s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end.” Id. at 2426. The standard is “not watered down[,] but really means what it says.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, a law that “targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.” Id. (emphasis added).

The State argues that it “indisputably has a compelling purpose of the highest order in the protection of its citizens from gun violence in houses of worship.” Dkt. 43, at 12n.5. Plaintiffs concede that the State “has a compelling

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