actions void as have been ventured on by themselves, and are likely to be hurtful to them in their consequences, and must punish those who ha^e availed themselves of the inexperience of the minors in this way.
. All that is here said of minors applies likewise to those who are deprived of reason, with the difference only which is suggested by the nature of the thing itself. No one more- over should be regarded in such a condition until he has been formally declared to be so, after an inquiry into the circumstances by medical men, and under the supervision of the magistrate; and the evil itself must always be considered as temporary, and the return of reason possible.
I have now considered all the objects to which State agency should be directed, and have endeavoured to lay down the ultimate principle by which it should be guided in each. Should this essay appear imperfect, and should I seem to have omitted much that is important in legislation, it must not be forgotten that it was not my intention to con- struct a theory of legislation (a task above my knowledge and abilities), but only to make it clearly evident how far legislation in its different branches might extend or restrict the limits of State agency. For, as legislation may be divided according to its objects, it can also be arranged according to its sources; and perhaps the latter system of division, particularly as regards the legislator himself, is especially interesting and rich in results. There seem to me to be only three such sources, or, to speak more correctly, three grand points of view from which the necessity of laws appears. The general object of legislation is to determine all that concerns the actions of the citizen and their necessary consequences. The first point of view, therefore, arises from the nature of those actions themselves, and of such of their consequences as flow solely from the principles of right. The second point of view is the special end of the State, the
