in order suddenly to assemble the yellowbacks (or else to "carry" them for long beforehand), would be prohibitive; and (2) that for long periods, like a year, the risk would be prohibitive. It is clear, then, that speculation of the sort here discussed would be conspicuous by its absence.
The effect of any such speculation, so far as it did exist, would, of course, be to cause expense to the Government or rather deprive it of the profit it would have made if the gold which the speculator held for a rise had been held by itself ; the temporary withdrawal of gold from the Government reserve should also perhaps be counted as a slight disadvantage to the Government.
But this is only a small part of the picture. As we have seen in the previous section, the Government, during such a period of gold appreciation as we have supposed, would itself be in the very position of the bull speculator and on an immeasurably larger scale. It would, as it were, be holding for a rise its entire gold reserve. Its percentage of reserve would be gaining and might, conceivably, even grow to exceed a 100% reserve. The speculator's losses, if any, would therefore simply be a negligible offset against the Government's own gains from the rising tide of gold value.[1]
- ↑ If the view which has been given (that such bull speculation would be too trifling to require any special provisions against it) were incorrect,—if, after all, the Government might be seriously embarrassed,—such a raid on the Treasury could be altogether avoided by a special proviso: the price of gold could be further restricted, so far as any upward change is concerned, so as not to be raised more than, say, one half of one per cent a month, i.e. at so small a rate, at most, as to be more than offset by the interest, etc., which the bull speculator would have to carry.
This restriction would only slightly hamper the stabilizing process; for it is only seldom, and never for long periods, that gold has appreciated relatively to goods more than one half of one per cent a month. This safeguard is mentioned, however, merely to meet completely all possible objections, however far-fetched or imaginary. Such a proviso would, I believe, be as superfluous as it would be innocuous.
If, as I suggested in "A" above, the brassage were 1% and the adjustment period two months the terms of the restriction just mentioned would be met anyway.
