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State v. Brown
Cite as 356 Ark. 460 (2004)
[356


embraced a heightened privacy protection for citizens in their homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, as evidenced by our constitution, state statutes, common law, and criminal rules.

Though it is clear that this court may deviate from federal precedent, the more relevant question is when should we do so? Without question, a slavish following of federal precedent would render this court's opinions merely a mirror image of federal jurisprudence, which would carry with it a certain abrogation of our duty to interpret our own state constitution and follow our own state law. Yet, we admit to a concern about deviating too much from federal precedent based solely on our state constitution. A proper balance must be struck between the two. Justice David Souter, when he served as a justice on the New Hampshire Supreme Court, said it best:

. . . It is the need of every appellate court for the participation of the bar in the process of trying to think sensibly and comprehensively about the questions that the judicial power has been established to answer. Nowhere is the need greater than in the field of State constitutional law, where we are asked so often to confront questions that have already been decided under the National Constitution. If we place too much reliance on federal precedent we will render the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we place too little, we will render State practice incoherent.

State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 82-83, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (1986) (Souter, J., concurring specially). For a general discussion, see Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights Through State Law: The United States Supreme Court Shows State Courts The Way, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 505 (2002).

This state's constitutional history and preexisting state law regarding the privacy rights of a home dweller in his or her home combine to support our decision to discard federal precedent and adopt an interpretation of our state constitution compatible with state law. See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). It would be redundant for us to retrace this state's strong history and tradition in favor of protecting privacy in our homes, which has already been expansively set forth in Jegley v. Picado, supra. Suffice it to say that this State has adopted and endorsed the principle of privacy in a citizen's home clearly and unmistakably since the time Arkansas was admitted to statehood.

This court is cognizant of what other states have done under their state constitutions in assessing the constitutionality of the