Cite as 356 Ark. 460 (2004)
intelligent waiver and since Mrs. Griggs was not told of her right to refuse consent to the search, the search was invalid. However, a knowing and intelligent consent is not required by our Federal Constitution. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, the [Supreme] Court said:
There is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing either in the purpose behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Rather, knowledge of the right to refuse consent is only a factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of consent and the state is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra. Even so, appellant [King] urges that since each state has the power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures under its own laws or constitution than are required by our Federal Constitution, we should impose a greater standard than articulated in Schneckloth. In our view the Schneckloth standard of required proof in consent to search is adequate under the terms of our constitution. Art. 2, § 15, Ark. Const. (1874). Although it appears Mrs. Griggs was not verbally informed of her right to refuse consent, she signed a consent to search her premises and a waiver of her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. She acknowledged that the consent and waiver form was read to her, she understood and signed it.
King, 262 Ark. at 346-47 (emphasis added).
As one can readily see, this court in King considered the question of whether, under art. 2, § 15, officers must advise a home dweller of his or her right to refuse consent before the officers can legally search the person's home. This court answered the question with a resounding "no," and went into considerable detail as to why a suspect's knowledge of the right to refuse consent is only a factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of a consent. The King decision had been good law since 1977, and the majority opinion glibly overrules it, apparently for the reason that case's holding stands in the way of the outcome the majority desires to reach.
