Page:State v. Brown.pdf/2

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Ark.]
State v. Brown
Cite as 356 Ark. 460 (2004)
461


  1. SEARCH & SEIZURE—FOURTH AMENDMENT—ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT BOUND BY FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN INTERPRETING ARKANSAS LAW.—Although the search-and-seizure language of Article 2, § 15, of the Arkansas Constitution is very similar to the words of the Fourth Amendment, the Arkansas Supreme Court is not bound by the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when interpreting Arkansas law; while the supreme court lacks authority to extend the protections of the Fourth Amendment beyond the holdings of the United States Supreme Court, it does have the authority to impose greater restrictions on police activities in Arkansas based upon state law than those the United States Supreme Court holds to be necessary based upon federal constitutional standards.
  2. SEARCH & SEIZURE—PRIVACY IN HOMES AT NIGHTTIME—RIGHT OF VAST IMPORTANCE.—The privacy of citizens in their homes, secure from nighttime intrusions, is a right of vast importance as attested not only by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, but also by the state and federal constitutions.
  3. SEARCH & SEIZURE—PERSON'S HOME AS ZONE OF PRIVACY—SACROSANCT RIGHT.—The right to privacy implicit in the Arkansas Constitution is a fundamental right that requires a compelling state interest to override it; the legal principle that a person's home is a zone of privacy is as sacrosanct as any right or principle under the state constitution and case law; Arkansas has clearly embraced a heightened privacy protection for citizens in their homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, as evidenced by the constitution, state statutes, common law, and criminal rules.
  4. SEARCH & SEIZURE CONSENT—KING V. STATE OVERRULED.—The supreme court departed from its holding in King v. State, 262 Ark. 342, 557 S.W.2d 386 (1977), which had adopted the standard set forth in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), when interpreting Ark. Const. art. 2, § 15; the case was overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition that a homeowner need not be apprised of his or her right to refuse a consent to search as a prerequisite to a valid consent to search that home.
  5. COURTS—PRECEDENT—WHEN BREAK WARRANTED.—Although as a general rule the supreme court is bound to follow precedent, it will break with precedent when the result is patently wrong and so manifestly unjust that a break becomes unavoidable.