Cite as 356 Ark. 460 (2004)
The majority opinion cites the case of Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332 (2000), for the legal principle that a person's home is a zone of privacy and it is as sacrosanct as any right or principle under our state constitution and case law. It also cites Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d 582 (2002); Griffin, however, was not a "knock and talk" consensual search case and is clearly not relevant here. The Jegley case, too, is inapposite. In brief terms, Jegley was a civil case that challenged the Arkansas sodomy statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-122 (Repl. 1997), which this court held unconstitutional as a matter of law. While this court in Jegley discussed Arkansas citizens' right of privacy, such a right is also recognized by the Constitution of the United States. Our courts have held that such intrusions are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Clearly, this country's Fourth Amendment was adopted to protect citizens from warrantless entry into a private home, and, in order to protect citizens against such warrantless intrusions to do so is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The State has the burden to prove a warrantless entry into a home is reasonable. Under Scott, supra, when a warrantless entry into the home is made with consent, the entry does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Finally, with respect to the majority's overruling of King, it is important to note that the majority relies on cases wherein this court "overruled other cases based on an evolving statement of public policy from our General Assembly." Of course, this court has held repeatedly that the determination of this state's public policy "lies almost exclusively in the legislative domain." See Bonds v. Carter, 348 Ark. 591, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002); Jordan v. Atlantic Cas. Ins., 344 Ark. 81, 40 S.W.3d 254 (2001); State v. Lester, 343 Ark. 662, 75 S.W.3d 192 (2002). Indeed, in Miller v. State, 338 Ark. 445, 994 S.W.2d 476 (1999), this court stated that "the public policy of the State of Arkansas is declared by the General Assembly, not its courts." Here, however, the majority takes it upon itself to declare, essentially, by judicial fiat, that it knows better than the General Assembly what our public policy should be.
In conclusion, because the trial court (with the majority's aid) has misinterpreted and misapplied Arkansas' consent-to-search law, I would reverse and remand this case for the trial court to consider the voluntariness of Brown's consent from the totality of the circumstances.
DICKEY, C.J., and IMBER, J., join this dissent.
