32 MEDDOWCROFT 0. HOLBROOKE 1B. BL. 6b
Meppoworort against HOLBROOKE. 1788. (Overruled, Vincent v. Holi, 1812, 4 Taunt. 455.)
A solicitor in Chancery may practise in the Equity side of the Exchequer without being admitted a solicitor in that Court (a).
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for 1261. 3s. 4d. the amount of bie bill aa an attorney and golicitor in the King’s Bench, Common Pleas, Chancery, and Equity side of the Exchequer. To this thera was a set-off, and the balance due to the plaintiff was 251. Is. 6d. for which a verdict was found, aubject to a reduction, if the Court should think fit, of such part as was charged for business donein the Equity side of the Exchequer, he not being a solicitor of that Court, though he had been admitted in Chancery. A rule having been obtained to shew cause why the verdict should nat be rectified, hy reducing the sum from 251. Is, 6d, ta 31. 4s,,
Bond and Cackell, Serjeants, shewed cause, arguing that the plaintiff did not. come within the meaning of the 24th section of the statute of 2 Geo. 2, ¢. 23. Itis not ‘necessary that an attorney should be admitted in the same Court in which he occasionally acts. If he be admitted in one Court, he may act in another, by consent of an attorney of that other. Solicitors in Courts of Equity ought to have this privilege ae well as attorneys in Common Law Courts. But a congent in writing is anutecossary, in Courts of Equity, where the praceedings are in the names of the clerks in Court. -
Lawrence and Runnington, Serjeants, in support of the role, contended that the plaintiff was strictly bound by the Act, the third section of which prohibits any person ‘from acting aa solicitor in any Court of Equity without being admitted in auch Court, which prohibition is not relaxed by the 10th section, which relates only to attorneye ; but even if it extended to solicitors, [51] a consent in writing was necessary, which the plaintiff had not obtained.
Lorp Loucnsorovucn.—The statute of the 2 Geo, 2, c. 23, is a penal law, and ought to be strictly gonatrued. The 3d and 7th sections are confined to persons who practised before tha Act passed, and therefore cannot refer to the 24th, as to the present cage. The words of the 24th section are, “without being admitted and inrolled as aforesaid.” The answer is, the plaintiff bas been admitted, and inrolled in Chancery; and being ao admitted, ha was entitled to practise of course on the Equity side of the Exchequer. A previous consent in writing is necessary in a Court of Law, but would have been uaglasa, where the proceedings are in the nama of the clerk in Court,
Rule discharged without costs,
Steel against Houghton et Uxor. 1788.
[Dictum approved, Neill v. Devonshire, 1882, 8 App. Cas. 156; Smith v. Andrews, [1891] 2 Ch. 703; Hanbury v. Jenkins, [1901] 2 Ch. 420; Simpson v. Attorney-General, [1904] A.C. 491.]
No person has, at common law, a right to glean in the harvest field. Neither have the poor of a parish legally settled (as such) any such right.
Trespass for breaking and entering the closes of the plaintiff, at Timworth in the county of Suffolk, treading down grass and corn, &c. and taking and carrying away carn, barley in the straw, &c. done by the wife.
Plea.—Justification, that the premises had been sown with barley, and the crop lately reaped, and carried off the land; "Wherefore the defendants, being parishioners and. inhabitants of the said parish of Timworth, legally settled therein, and being poor and necessitous, and indigent persons, after the crop growing in the year aforesaid, in and upon the said close, in which, &c. had bean reaped, cut down, taken and carried away by the said plaintiff from and off the said close, in which, &c. to wit, at the said times when, &c. the said Mary (the defendant) entered into the said close, in
(a) [Dob, Vincent v. Holl, 4 Taunt. 452. Where it was held that a solicitor of the Equity side of the Exchequer is not entitled to practise in Chancery.]
