Page:Study of History.djvu/117

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des Thatbestandes, und jede Kombination, jede Zusammenfassung und Schlussfolgerung, ohne die es doch einmal nicht abgeht, ist ein subjektiver Akt des Forschers. Demnach blieb Waitz, bei der eigenen Arbeit wie bei jener der anderen, immer höchst mistrauisch gegen jedes Résumé, jede Definition, jedes abschliessende Wort.—Sybel, Historische Zeitschrift, Ivi. 484. Mit blosser Kritik wird darin nichts ausgerichtet, denn die ist nur eine Vorarbeit, welche da aufhört wo die echte historische Kimst anfängt.—Lasaulx, Philosophie der Künste, 212.

61  The only case in which such extraneous matters can be fairly called in is when facts are stated resting on testimony; then it is not only just, but it is necessary for the sake of truth, to inquire into the habits of mind of him by whom they are adduced.—Babbage, Bridgewater Treatise, p. xiv.

62  There is no part of our knowledge which it is more useful to obtain at first hand—to go to the fountain-head for than our knowledge of History.—J. S. Mill, Inaugural Address, 34. The only sound intellects are those which, in the first instance, set their standard of proof high.— J. S. Mill, Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, 525.

63  There are so few men mentally capable of seeing both sides of a question; so few with consciences sensitively alive to the obligation of seeing both sides; so few placed under conditions either of circumstance or temper, which admit of their seeing both sides.—Greg, Political Problems, 1870, 173. II n'y a que les Allemands qui sachent être aussi complètement objec-