or, at the least, of approbation or censure; insomuch that to employ those names in conjunction with others by which the contrary sentiments were expressed, would produce the effect of a paradox, or even a contradiction in terms. The baneful influence of a connotation thus acquired, on the prevailing habits of thought, especially in morals and politics, has been well pointed out on many occasions by Bentham. It gives rise to the fallacy of "question-begging names." The very property which we are inquiring whether a thing possesses or not, has become so associated with the name of the thing as to be part of its meaning, insomuch that by merely uttering the name we assume the point which was to be made out; one of the most frequent sources of apparently self-evident propositions.
Without any further multiplication of examples to illustrate the changes which usage is continually making in the signification of terms, I shall add, as a practical rule, that the logician, not being able to prevent such transformations, should submit to them with a good grace when they are irrevocably effected, and if a definition is necessary, define the word according to its new meaning; retaining the former as a second signification, if it is needed, and if there is any chance of being able to preserve it either in the language of philosophy or in common use. Logicians can not make the meaning of any but scientific terms; that of all other words is made by the collective human race. But logicians can ascertain clearly what it is which, working obscurely, has guided the general mind to a particular employment of a name; and when they have found this, they can clothe it in such distinct and permanent terms, that mankind shall see the meaning which before they only felt, and shall not suffer it to be afterward forgotten or misapprehended.
Chapter VI.
The Principles Of A Philosophical Language Further Considered.
§ 1. We have, thus far, considered only one of the requisites of a
language adapted for the investigation of truth; that its terms shall each
of them convey a determinate and unmistakable meaning. There are, however,
as we have already remarked, other requisites; some of them important only
in the second degree, but one which is fundamental, and barely yields in
point of importance, if it yields at all, to the quality which we have
already discussed at so much length. That the language may be fitted for
its purposes, not only should every word perfectly express its meaning,
but there should be no important meaning without its word. Whatever we
have occasion to think of often, and for scientific purposes, ought to
have a name appropriated to it.
This requisite of philosophical language may be considered under three different heads; that number of separate conditions being involved in it.
§ 2. First, there ought to be all such names, as are needful for making such a record of individual observations that the words of the record shall exactly show what fact it is which has been observed. In other words, there should be an accurate Descriptive Terminology.
The only things which we can observe directly being our own sensations, or other feelings, a complete descriptive language would be one in which there should be a name for every variety of elementary sensation or
