Opinion of the Court
instrumentalities at the time of the FSIA’s enactment in 1976 was civil, the Executive Branch occasionally attempted to subject foreign-government-owned entities to federal criminal investigation. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Shipping Industry, 186 F. Supp. 298, 318–320 (DC 1960); In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F. R. D. 280, 288–291 (DC 1952). Given that history, it becomes even more unlikely that Congress sought to codify foreign sovereign immunity from criminal proceedings without saying a word about such proceedings.
Congress’s determination about the FSIA’s precise location within the U. S. Code bolsters that inference. Congress expressly decided to house each provision of the FSIA within Title 28, which mostly concerns civil procedure. See 90 Stat. 2891. But the FSIA did not alter Title 18, which addresses crimes and criminal procedure.
Finally, this Court’s decision in Samantar supports the conclusion that the FSIA does not apply to criminal proceedings. In Samantar, we considered whether the FSIA’s immunity provisions applied to a suit against an individual foreign official based on actions taken in his official capacity. 560 U. S., at 308. Analyzing the Act’s “text, purpose, and history,” the Court determined that the FSIA’s “comprehensive solution for suits against states” does not “exten[d] to suits against individual officials.” Id., at 323, 325.
As in Samantar, we conclude here that the FSIA’s provisions concerning suits against foreign states and their instrumentalities do not extend to a discrete context—in this case, criminal proceedings. The Act’s “careful calibration” of jurisdiction, procedures, and remedies for civil litigation confirms that Congress did not “cover” criminal proceedings. Id., at 319. Put simply, immunity in criminal proceedings “was not the particular problem to which Congress was responding.” Id., at 323.
