when the decision to assault emanates from the firing line, a series of unsuccessful assaults will result. These will, however, bring good troops closer and closer to the enemy, until the great moment of definitely gained superiority finally arrives.
The General Staff account of the Franco-German war[1] very aptly
describes the decisive moment for the assault: "The tension of the
tactical situation was increased to the highest pitch by the prolonged fight
at close range; the time was now ripe for the decision and the German
corps commanders issued orders for the assault. Before this order reached
the leading line, however, the German general officers on the spot had
decided, at about 7:30 P. M., to undertake the assault on their own responsibility,
as they considered the attack sufficiently prepared. On the
signal given by them, and in many instances of their own accord, the
Prussian and Saxon battalions hurled themselves, just as the sun was setting,
on the position which had been so long and so tenaciously defended
by the enemy." (St. Privat). Consult, Der 18. August, pp. 525 and 571.
"When the XIth Army Corps issued from the Niederwald (near Wörth), the infantry encountered such a heavy fire from the direction of Elsaszhausen that the troops had to choose between either advancing farther or giving up the advantages that had been gained at such great sacrifices. The former course was indeed open to objection, as the troops were exhausted, as organizations were in confusion from the fighting they had just gone through, and as only three formed and fresh battalions were available."—"General von Bose now ordered a general attack. At the signal 'the whole force will advance', the firing lines rushed from the Niederwald and, with loud cheers, threw themselves upon the enemy."[2]
The assault was thus not a result of the superiority that had been gained, but an act of desperation in a situation that had become unbearable. Moreover, the success of the assault was not due to any numerical superiority of the attacker, but to the lack of initiative of the defender, and to the fact that he confined himself to purely defensive action.
It is, therefore, after all, an open question whether the
initiative of parts of the line should govern the conduct of the
entire force. In some instances, it certainly ought not to govern,
if disaster is to be avoided. When a portion of the firing
line advances, however, and the tactical situation in any way
permits, neighboring units should at once conform to the
movement. The units in rear, in particular, should, in this
