liberation a scheme for the dismemberment of Austria”; and Mr. Noel Buxton, in various letters and articles in the press, adopts the same view and tries to argue that the Austro-Hungarian problem can be solved on a basis of “home rule.” His whole attitude is an amazing example of that “sloppy thinking in regard to the war,” against which he himself protests in a letter to the New Statesman. As has more than once been pointed out in The New Europe, those who persist in treating the disruption of Austria-Hungary as an altogether new item in the programme of the Allies, are shutting their eyes—whether wilfully or as the result of sloppy thinking—to the fact that we have long stood committed to such a policy, by reason of our treaties with Russia, Italy, and Roumania, and of our moral obligations to Serbia. The disruption of Austria-Hungary represents a fundamental aim and aspiration of at least four of the Allied nations, and is now part of the settled policy of the French. Russian, and Italian Governments. Those in this country who oppose it must be under no illusions. They may be able to save Austria-Hungary from disruption, but only at the cost of the disruption of the Entente, and in the long run, of the British Empire itself, whose very existence would be threatened by the survival of Austria-Hungary in her present condition of hopeless military, political, economic, and financial vassalage to Germany.
A German Warning from America
The Europäische Staats- und Wirtschafts-Zeitung of 31 December 1916, publishes a remarkable unsigned letter, dated 11 November, from New York and posted on board the “Deutschland,” in which, after references to the President’s election, and the desire for peace among the American masses, he emphasizes very strongly the view, “that the sinking of passenger ships without warning is impossible without producing serious conflicts. The President would in such a case probably be content with sending home the ambassador: but the indignation which would follow in Germany would probably unchain a thorough-going submarine war, whose effects here cannot be foreseen. At this moment the Allies have very considerable difficulty in satisfying their needs in America. The huge rise of prices has injured them probably more than the injury due to submarine warfare. This gives rise to serious financial troubles, which are getting steadily more urgent. If there should be a breach between Germany and the United States—even without war—these financial troubles would no longer exist. American industry would be mobilised for the purposes of the Allies in such a way that England would not lose breath for many years, quite apart from the possibility of America in the end entering the war. In the last few days I have had verbal messages from Germany, and I am horrified that the true American situation should still not be realised. It is already a hard enough struggle for us to exhaust England.”
This letter, which was published when the war of Peace Notes was at its height and before the Tirpitz policy of “unrestrained frightfulness” was openly adopted by Berlin, is almost prophetic in the light of subsequent events.
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