Appendix A
Air Staff Reaction to Project RAND Report Dated 28 October 1957[1]
The United States should not take hasty action to commit itself to a generalization of space control which in the future could limit progress in development and technological research for space travel.
There should be an expansion of the military role in evaluating advantages and disadvantages which will affect policy, planning, and coordination required for guiding the efforts of future space activities in favorable directions.
Terminology in naming United States satellites should be considered if the possibility of premature ICAO consideration is to be minimized.
Military implication of outer space activities on United States national security should be outlined.
An exhaustive study should be conducted on the legal aspects, with assignment of responsibility to an appropriate Air Staff agency for such a study.
Study groups should examine space era aspects such as (A) The offensive use of space missiles or satellites; (B) Force structure and strategic concepts; (C) The acquisition of effective deterrence; and (D) Establishment of appropriate international agreements.
The United States should show its readiness to negotiate and conclude agreements on specific projects for international cooperation in uses of outer space, such as (A) continuation of the IGY, (B) further exchange of satellite tracking data, and (C) an effort to launch into space a scientific rocket or satellite designed and perhaps financed under international auspices. (Details of such agreements and the sequence in which they should be proposed or concluded must depend on developing space technology, the current political-strategic situation, and other factors.)
- ↑ Staff Study, Air Doctrine Branch, Air Policy Division, Directorate of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, 8 October 1958, 8-9. Copy on file at HQ USAF, Pentagon Support Office, Office of Air Force History.
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