further noted that nations could not control (police) outer space even if they declared outer space as being part of their sovereignty. Thus, he argued that sovereignty should not extend into outer space.[1] Prince Heinrich argued that a resolution of the boundary between airspace and outer space was, however, needed to assure the freedom of exploration in outer space.[2] If they did not resolve the sovereignty issue, nations would likely make territorial claims based on the landing of scientific devices on bodies in outer space.[3]
Eisenhower, a Nuclear Pearl Harbor, and Air Force Balloons
Prior to Professor Cooper’s treatise, many elements within the United States, including the US Army Air Forces (AAF), had been interested in outer space and its potential exploitation for military or intelligence purposes. Concurrent with Project RAND’s start up in 1946, Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, deputy chief of staff for research and development, directed that RAND assist the AAF in demonstrating its capabilities vis-à-vis space. Within three weeks, RAND produced a study titled Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship, an engineering analysis of satellite feasibility. This 1946 study concluded that such satellites were an unlikely base for offensive weapons.[4]
By April 1951, Project RAND had completed an Air Force sponsored study contemplating the eventuality of earth observation satellites. As a result of the RAND report and because the Air Force Strategic Air Command needed assistance in developing reconnaissance that could help determine appropriate targets behind the Iron Curtain, the Air Force, in January 1952, convened a Beacon Hill study group (formally titled Project Lincoln) under the auspices of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).[5] The study group was to assess various issues generated by such satellites. The study group included industry scientists and academicians.[6] In its final report issued in June 1952, the Beacon Hill group concluded that observation satellite systems could infringe on another country’s sovereignty. Its report specifically acknowledged the potential for “intrusion” over Soviet territory.[7]
- ↑ Heinrich completed his doctor of law thesis entitled “Air Law and Space” (“Luftrecht und Weltraum”) in 1953 while at Georg-August University in Göttingen, Germany. His doctoral thesis was a continuation of the work initiated in the 1930s by Vladimir Mandl.
- ↑ Heinrich, 2-7.
- ↑ Bowen, 61. Bowen cites “Space Law,” a symposium prepared at the request of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, chairman, Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, 85th Congo 2d sess. 31 December 1958, 129 (hereafter “Space Law”), which in turn cites Oscar Schachter, “Who Owns the Universe?” in Corneilus Ryan, ed., Across the Space Frontiers (New York: Viking Press, 1952).
- ↑ Project RAND began operating in May 1946 and was initially an independent consulting contractor of the Army Air Forces with Douglas Aircraft Company in Santa Monica, California. RAND was created in 1946 at the direction of Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, commanding general of the US Army Air Forces (AAF). In 1948 Project RAND was reorganized as a nonprofit consulting firm, the RAND Corporation. In 1949 and again in 1951, RAND published studies titled, “Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance.” Over the years, RAND has produced a series of studies for the Air Force and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Between 1946 and 1956, little was accomplished in the actual development of a satellite as contemplated by RAND due in part to fiscal restraints, skepticism within the scientific community, and interservice rivalries. Such rivalry was typified by LeMay's 1946 request to RAND and other actions. (Spires, 14-24.) These rivalries continued into the 1950s with guided missiles spawning contentions. Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960, vol. 4, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), 40-41. Concurrent development of a booster to launch such a satellite into orbit had not progressed very far and for many of the same reasons.
- ↑ Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach. The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954-1974 (Langley, Va.: Center for Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), 17.
- ↑ Air Force Lt Col Richard S. Leghorn, who would later be instrumental in creating Eisenhower's open skies policy, was the Air Force liaison to the study group. In 1946 and 1948 he had presented papers arguing that the United States should develop a high altitude strategic and tactical reconnaissance capability. Leghorn, an MIT graduate, had served as an Army Air Forces reconnaissance officer in Europe during World War II. After the war, he worked for Eastman Kodak but was recalled to active duty during the Korean War. Initially, in April 1951, he became the head of the Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Development Command, Dayton, Ohio, but in early 1952 was assigned to the Pentagon staff of Col Bernard A Shriever, assistant for development planning to the Air Force deputy chief of staff for development. In the latter position, Leghorn helped lay the groundwork for what would eventually become the U-2. Members of the study group included Chairman Carl F. P. Overhage (Eastman Kodak), Edward M. Purcell (Harvard University), Saville Davis (Christian Science Monitor), Allen F. Donovan (Cornell Aeronautics Laboratory), Peter C. Goldmark (Columbia Broadcasting System Laboratories), Edwin H. Land (founder, Polaroid Corporation). Stewart E. Miller (Bell Laboratories), Richard S. Perkin (Perkin-Elmer Company), and Louis E. Ridenour (Ridenour Associates), Pedlow and Welzenbach, 4, 6-7, 18.
- ↑ R. Cargill Hall, “Origins of US Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space,” Colloquy (December 1993), 19.
